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 Drawing on survey data on the members of six British parties 
gathered in the immediate aftermath of the general election of 2015, 
this paper addresses the question of what members do for their 
parties during campaigns. It identifies a key distinction between 
traditional forms of activity and more recent forms of online 
campaign participation. While the well-established general 
incentives theory of participation continues to offer a useful basis for 
explaining both types of campaign activism, we find that our 
understanding is significantly enhanced by considering the impact of 
national and local political contexts. Whereas the former chiefly adds 
explanatory value to the model of online participation by party 
members, the latter considerably improves the model of offline 
participation.  
 
  
There is a small but nonetheless significant association between parties’ 
activity and their electoral performance (Johnston and Pattie, 2003; Karp, 
Banducci and Bowler, 2008; Fisher and Denver, 2009; André and Depauw, 
2016).  Research also suggests that party members in particular make a 
difference (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992: 195-200) – not surprisingly, perhaps, 
since it is they who provide a good deal (although not necessarily the bulk [see 
Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2014; Scarrow, 2014: 103-109; Webb, Poletti & 
Bale,  2017]) of the voluntary workers who run the phone banks, deliver leaflets, 
canvass door-to-door in the run-up to the election, and then remind people to 
vote and even help them get to the polling stations on election day itself.  
Indeed, it is these campaign activities – along with contributing funds, playing 
some role in policy formation, being ‘ambassadors in the community’, 
providing a pool of recruits for elected office, and providing a degree of 
legitimacy for what would otherwise be transparently hollow organisations – 
that are at the heart of what members supposedly do for their parties (Scarrow 
1994). 
If members are central to these campaign efforts, then we clearly need 
to understand what drives their willingness to engage in such activity. That is 
the aim of this paper. As part of a wider project on contemporary party 
membership in the UK, we made a point of surveying members within a week 
or so of the general election in the hope that respondents’ recall of what they 
did during the campaign would be accurate. In this paper, we describe what 
members do for their parties during the heat of battle and explain what might 
drive the range of activities they undertake. In particular, we seek to add value 
to the best-known specific model of activism among party members, the 
‘General Incentives Model’ (GIM), first introduced in the pioneering work of 
Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and 
Richardson, 1994; Whiteley and Seyd, 1998; Whiteley, Seyd and Billinghurst, 
2005) by first testing how the model performs with new modes of online 
campaigning, as well as with more traditional campaign activities. We show 
that, while still valuable, the GIM is no longer fully serviceable for an era of 
social media communication and campaigning. We proceed to reveal how 
different types of activity are rooted in local and national contexts. Specifically, 
we demonstrate that it is necessary to distinguish between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ 
forms of campaign activism, since – over and above general incentives – 
campaigning ‘in real life’ is driven to a significant extent by local party and 
constituency factors, whereas online campaigning is not. 
 
Theoretical approach 
In attempting to describe and explain the range of campaign activity of British 
party members we start by briefly describing the General Incentives Model 
(GIM).  Introduced by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) a generation ago, it covered 
(but was not confined to) campaign activity, and was grounded in the 
assumption that participation occurs in response to different kinds of 
incentives. While this model has widely been found to be of use in explaining 
the decision to join a party (Poletti, Webb & Bale, forthcoming), and to be active 
within it - and indeed we will confirm the continuing value of most of its 
elements in our own data in due course – we would nevertheless argue that we 
need to go beyond general incentives to gain a fuller understanding of what 
motivates party members’ campaign activism today. In the second decade of 
the twenty-first century, social media is part and parcel of the repertoire of 
contemporary political participation, along with more traditional party 
campaign activities. The use of Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Reddit, Instagram 
and other forms of digital communication mean that it has become increasingly 
common for citizens to publicise political information and messages on behalf 
of and about candidates and parties – and of course to discuss them. In this 
way, they can participate in campaigns in a meaningful way even if the full 
extent of the effects of online participation remains unclear at present (Di 
Gennaro & Dutton 2006; Visser and Stolle 2014; Freezel 2016). On the one 
hand, this development leads us to wonder whether the GIM is still a valid tool 
for capturing the incentives that lead members to participate in modern forms 
of online campaign as well as in more traditional ones. On the other hand, it 
gives us the chance to better understand the influence of a geographical 
dimension linked to different types of party experience which might affect these 
two types of political campaigning.  
In comparing offline and online behaviour, it is likely that the GIM does 
not directly capture the fact that party members who participate in the types of 
‘offline’ participation that have traditionally typified campaigning activity – 
leafletting, attending meetings and hustings, canvassing, and so on – are more 
likely to be influenced by what happens in their local party and constituency (as 
opposed to the national party) than those members who only participate online. 
Of course, those whose experience of party membership brings them into direct, 
face-to-face contact with other members will be aware of events that the 
national party and leadership are involved in; but for the most part they directly 
experience membership as a local phenomenon. Online participation works in 
a different way. Since it is possible for individuals to restrict their political 
participation – even if they are party members – to online activity without 
undertaking any further forms of engagement, it follows that social media users 
may generally be less susceptible to the influence of the local political context, 
and correspondingly be more conditioned by national political factors. The two 
activities are of course not mutually exclusive, as members who participate 
offline are most likely to participate online as well. But the opposite is not 
necessarily the case, so we investigate these two modes of participation 
separately. 
Our general expectation, then, is that local factors will prove to be 
stronger predictors of offline activism while national factors will be stronger 
predictors of online activism. After outlining our expectations in more detail 
and presenting our data, we test this idea first by showing, through Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) that there are indeed two distinct types of activism 
for party members – the online and offline variants – before proceeding to test 
the predictors of these two types of activism in a series of explanatory models. 
 
Modelling campaign activism: Hypotheses 
Our intention here is to test three groups of predictors in relation to current 
British party memberships, derived, in turn, from the GIM, from national 
political factors and from local political factors, while controlling for party 
affiliation and demographic background. Although we do not think of these as 
alternatives but rather as complements to each other, we will in the first 
instance examine their respective performances separately. In broad terms, the 
first key question that we address here is whether the GIM is still able to explain 
campaign activism in the 21st century, both offline and online. A second key 
question is whether, over and above the GIM, national and local factors are able 
to help explain activism, and whether the results differ significantly for online 
and offline types.  
 
General Incentives Model (GIM) 
The General Incentives Model, a seminal approach to explaining political 
participation, covered (but was not confined to) campaign activity and was 
‘grounded in the assumption that participation occurs in response to different 
kinds of incentives…but it goes beyond a narrowly cast economic analysis of 
incentives to include emotional attachments to the party, moral concerns, and 
social norms, variables which lie outside the standard cost-benefit approach to 
decision-making’ (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994: 109). 
Thus, the model includes incentives for activism such as group efficacy 
(the respondent’s perception of the probability that his or her participation in 
group activity through the party will achieve a desired collective outcome), 
selective outcome and process incentives, collective incentives (i.e., desired 
collective policy outcomes), expressive (or affective) incentives, altruism, the 
impact of social norms, and the perceived costs of activism (the last of these 
being a disincentive, properly speaking) (Seyd and Whiteley 1992: 112). Since 
each of these incentives was shown to be a significant influence on activism in 
studies of the Labour (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992), Conservative (Whiteley, Seyd 
and Richardson, 1994) and Liberal Democrat parties (Whiteley, Seyd and 
Billinghurst, 2005) in the 1990s, our starting point is to hypothesize that the 
same thing will still hold today for both offline and online participation. 
However, given that online participation is presumably less costly in terms of 
time and effort than more traditional offline activities, we also expect that costs 
of activism will not be a disincentive in participating online.  
 
(H1) A positive relationship exists between the various incentives 
to participate and campaign activity, and, in the case of offline 
activities, a negative relationship for the costs of activism.  
 
The national factors model 
After testing the GIM for different types of activism in the 21st century, we 
introduce the national and local factors models, in the expectation that 
members might be impacted by factors related to their perceptions and 
experience of the party at national level, and by factors related to their 
impressions and experience of the party at local level. What is more, these 
national and local factors might be expected to impact differently on online and 
offline forms of participation. Starting with national factors, we particularly 
focus on three aspects: (a) perceived ideological (in)congruence with the 
national party, (b) personal impressions of the party at national level, and (c) 
mobilization by the national party. 
 The first of these is perceived ideological incongruence. Does it matter 
if a member regards himself/herself as ideologically distant from the national 
party, and if so, how (van Haute and Carty, 2012; see also Kölln and Polk, 
2017)? Specifically, we take a cue from John May’s (1973) ‘law’ of curvilinear 
disparity, which suggests that the most active members of parties are strongly 
motivated by ideological concerns and likely to be more radical than national 
party leaders or voters. Although this idea has found (at best) mixed support in 
the literature (e.g. Norris, 1995; van Holsteyn et al., 2017), it nevertheless 
generates the expectation that the more ideologically radical a member sees 
himself/herself as being with respect to the national party leadership, the more 
active he or she will be.  
 
(H2a) The more radical a member feels with respect to his or her 
national party in left-right terms, the more likely he or she is to 
participate in campaign activity (the ‘national party May’s Law 
hypothesis’).  
 
 
Beyond ideological radicalism, we would hypothesize that there are also 
impressions of the national leadership that might impact on the activism of 
party members. In essence, our argument here is that the more positive an 
impression a member has of his or her national leader, the more likely he or she 
is to be a willing activist on behalf of the party. Specifically: 
 
(H2b) The more positively a member feels about the national party 
leadership’s relationship with the membership, the more willing he or 
she will be to play an active part in the party’s campaign. 
 
The third factor we take into account is mobilization by the national party. We 
hypothesize that if members are recruited directly by the national party, it 
might help to mobilize their involvement in the campaign – but only in so far 
as online activism is concerned. This rests on the logic that those who are 
recruited directly by the party HQ usually first establish contact via the internet 
nowadays (eg, the party’s national website). However, they might lack contact 
with a face-to-face local network that will motivate them to undertake more 
traditional types of campaign activity. 
 
(H2c) If a member has been recruited directly by the national party, 
he or she is less likely to participate in offline activities, and more likely 
to participate in online activities.  
 
The local factors model 
The Local Factors Model is essentially the local counterpart of the National 
Factors Model, with similar elements of ideological congruence, impressions of 
local party, and recruitment by local party. In addition, however, we 
incorporate a fourth element that takes into account the characteristics of the 
constituency electoral context. 
 We start by returning to the matter of left-right ideology. While H2a 
above hypothesized that the more radical members perceive themselves to be 
relative to their national parties in left-right terms, the more likely they are to 
participate in campaign activity, this will not necessarily hold in respect of 
members’ views of their local party, since the local party can be expected to 
consist of other active members who will be similarly ideologically radical, at 
least according to May’s Law. We might, therefore, expect a greater sense of 
left-right proximity to (ie, ideological congruence with) the local party among 
the most active members. This will not necessarily apply to any model of online 
activity, however, since direct engagement with local party members is not 
required for the latter. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding offline 
activism: 
 
(H3a) The closer a member feels to his or her local party in 
ideological left-right terms, the more likely he or she is to 
participate in offline campaign activity (the ‘local party 
ideological congruence hypothesis’). 
 
As a counterpart to the national factors hypothesis H2b above, we would also 
expect that the more positive members’ impressions of their local party 
experiences are, the more likely they will be to participate in the campaign. 
However, once again this would not necessarily be a predictor of online 
activism, since the latter does not require any direct engagement with the local 
party membership. 
 
 (H3b) The more positively a member feels about his or her local party, 
the more willing he or she will be to participate in offline campaign 
activity. 
 
Moreover, we assume that those who are recruited directly by the local party 
will be more likely to become embedded in local party activity from the outset. 
They will, therefore, be more likely to experience traditional offline activities 
such as attending meetings, leafletting and canvassing; again, however, this 
does not necessarily apply to online activities.  
 
(H3c) If a member has been recruited directly by the local party, 
he or she is more likely to participate in offline activities. 
 
In terms of local factors, it is also important to take into account one potentially 
important contextual factor, that of constituency marginality. We know that 
turnout will generally be highest when ‘electoral competition is greatest’ 
(Franklin, 2004: 57), even though the probability of a single vote being decisive, 
or pivotal, in a large election is very low. Moreover, voting can be seen as a ‘low 
cost-low benefit’ activity (Aldrich 1993), meaning that even small changes in 
this probability might have an effect on incentives to participate in an election. 
Notwithstanding some evidence that the usual relationship between 
marginality and turnout was less strong than usual in 2015 (Denver, 2015: 22), 
we assume that marginality matters for campaigning because the lower the 
probability that a party member’s political action will affect the electoral 
outcome at constituency level, the less likely it is that a rational member living 
in that constituency would campaign (Denver and Hands, 1985; Matsusaka and 
Palda, 1993; Pattie and Johnston 2005). This is a logic that again probably only 
applies to offline campaigning, since it seems likely (at least in the absence of 
further empirical research on the matter) that the bulk of online activity will 
focus on national rather than local politics.  In our case, looking at post-2015 
general electoral campaign data, this logic can be expected to apply only to 
members of those parties that finished first or second in a constituency in 2010 
and which would, therefore, have been afforded a reasonable chance of winning 
it in 2015. Since Labour and the Conservatives came in the top two places far 
more often than any of the other parties in 2010, this marginality effect is more 
likely to be significant for the major two parties than for the smaller parties.  
 
(H3d) For the two major parties, the smaller the majority of the local MP 
in a constituency in the previous general election, the more effort party 
members will put into the next electoral campaign offline.    
 
Finally, we would add a general expectation that national factors will be a strong 
predictor of online activism, whereas local factors will prove to be a stronger 
predictor of offline activism. This is because those who participate in traditional 
offline campaigning tend to experience the party at the local level, while those 
who campaign online are likely to focus more on the party at national level given 
the national nature of most of the political material available on the internet. 
 
(H4) national factors will be stronger in predicting online 
participation, whereas local factors will be more useful in 
predicting offline participation  
 
In addition to these variables designed to test the hypotheses we add a number 
of standard demographic and party controls, although we are not substantively 
interested in such effects in this paper.1 
 
Data and measures 
We surveyed 5696 members of six British parties just after the general election 
in May 2015. The survey was conducted by YouGov using an online-panel and 
was funded by the ESRC as part on an ongoing project on party membership in 
the UK.2   
 In order to construct the dependent variables for offline and online 
campaign activism, we first seek to justify the premise that online and offline 
activism are different from each other and potentially driven by different 
motives. In order to verify this we run a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
of the nine campaign activities used in our survey: liking a party or candidate 
on Facebook, tweeting something positive for or about the party or candidate, 
displaying a poster, delivering party leaflets, attending public meetings, 
canvassing voters, helping to run a party committee room, driving voters to 
polling stations and standing as a candidate at national or local level.3 We find 
that two latent factors do indeed exist and are clearly distinguished from each 
other: one includes campaign activity on Facebook and Twitter (the ‘online 
activity factor’), and the other includes all the other campaign activities (the 
‘offline activity factor’).4 We then construct an additive scale for each set of 
activities running from ‘no activity during the election campaign’ to ‘maximal 
activity during the campaign’, these capturing the intensity of party members’ 
offline (0-7) and online (0-2) political campaigning at the 2015 general election 
respectively.5 We treat these as count variables and we use them as dependent 
variables in Negative Binomial and Poisson regression analyses (Long 1997).6 
In both cases, we use robust clustered standard errors at the constituency level.  
The complete list of wording and coding of the independent variables 
can be found in the Appendix. 7  The General Incentives Model includes a 
measure of group efficacy, and additive indices capturing incentives for 
selective outcomes and processes, collective outcomes, expressive motivations, 
altruism, social norms and the costs of activism.  
The National Factors Model includes a number of variables, including 
one that captures the extent to which a respondent is ideologically radical 
compared to his or her own party. We calculate this by taking the difference 
between each individual member’s left-right self-location and the average 
perceived left-right location of their national party. From this we construct a 
single variable measuring proximity to the party’s ideological extremity, which 
takes positive values for positions to the left of the national party average for 
left-of-centre parties in 2015 (Labour, Greens, Liberal Democrat, SNP) and to 
the right of the national party average for right-of-centre parties (Conservatives 
and UKIP). Negative values indicate instead more centrist positions. The 
National Factors Model also includes indicators of whether members were 
approached by the national party at the time of joining and their attitude 
towards the party leadership (a scale created from variables tapping whether or 
not members feel ‘respected by’ and ‘paid attention to’ by the national 
leadership). 
The Local Factors Model includes variables that capture the degree of 
ideological congruence with the party at the local level (a measure of perceived 
distance between the member’s left-right ideology and that which they ascribe 
to their local party meetings, regardless of the direction); image of the party at 
local level (a scale including perceptions of meetings as ‘united’, ‘friendly’ and 
‘interesting’). A measure of constituency marginality (the difference between 
the vote share of the first and second party within each constituency) is also 
included in this Local Factors Model; specifically, we include an interaction 
term between constituency marginality and a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether a respondent is a member of one of the major two parties (Labour/ 
Conservative) or not.  
Finally, the model testing for online campaign predictors also controls 
for offline participation, since we expect those engaged in traditional offline 
activities to be more likely also to use social media as a means of expressing 
their political preferences. 
 
Data analysis: Key descriptivesNot surprisingly, perhaps, Table 1 shows us 
that the campaign activities that are least costly to members in terms of time 
and effort are those most likely to be reported. This is consistent with previous 
research on the difference between low- and high-intensity political 
participation (Whiteley & Seyd 2002). ‘Liking’ a post on Facebook, tweeting on 
Twitter, and displaying party posters in the window are easily done, and 
roughly a third to a half of all respondents did these things in the 2015 election.  
Attending public meetings and delivering leaflets on behalf of a candidate both 
take more effort since they involve actually leaving the house; but they do not 
necessarily require any ongoing commitment, and overall between 40% and 
45% of our respondents report having done these things. Heavier 
commitments, like standing for elective office (locally or nationally), running 
party committee rooms, or ‘knocking-up’ and driving voters to the polls on 
election day, attracted far fewer participants, however: under 10% engaged in 
these activities.  Finally, about one-sixth of members (16.3%) admitted to 
having done nothing at all for their parties during the campaign.8 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
These are the general patterns of campaign activism, but there are of course 
some variations by party. With respect to non-participation, there seems to be 
something of a left-right split, with Conservative (23%) and UKIP (21%) 
members being significantly more likely to admit having done nothing for their 
parties, while – at the other end of the scale – the extraordinary surge of 
enthusiasm around the SNP in 2014-15 seems to have driven more than 90% of 
its membership to do at least something for the party during the campaign. This 
willingness to engage on the part of SNP members is reflected in well-above 
average tendencies to display the party’s posters, attend hustings and be active 
on social media – testament to the infamous ‘cybernats’ (see McKirdy and 
Jones, 2015). But these, of course, are relatively ‘low-cost’ activities; SNP 
members are no more likely (indeed, perhaps even less likely) than their 
counterparts in other parties to have taken part in canvassing or to have stood 
for office.  
 
In fact, the ‘minor’ parties generally return higher percentages of members who 
are willing to stand for elective office, although this may of course be a simple 
function of size: if the smaller parties run anything like the same number of 
candidates as their larger counterparts, then a greater proportion of their 
members are bound to be called upon.  The fact that, the SNP aside, they often 
stand no chance of actually winning may even help persuade members to 
volunteer in that it reduces the risk that anyone doing so simply as a favour to 
their party will be required actually to serve as an elected representative. Not 
altogether surprisingly, members of the parties with the oldest members (UKIP 
and the Conservatives) show least inclination to engage on social media, while 
members of the party with the youngest members (the Greens) are second only 
to SNP members in their enthusiasm for such activity. The oldest and perhaps 
most institutionalized parties (Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) 
are still the ones most likely to find members willing to undertake the crucial 
organizational tasks of running party committees and canvassing electors. It 
may be the case, then, that, while parties like the SNP, UKIP and the Greens 
enjoyed a surge in membership prior to the 2015 election, the ‘institutionalized’ 
commitment of their members did not yet run as deep as in the older, more 
established parties. 
 
The detail of Table 1 is interesting, but it is a little hard to take in at a glance.   
Therefore, the penultimate row of the same table presents a simple additive 
index, ordered by party, which summarizes the overall level of activism among 
respondents during the election. This simply ascribes a score of 1 for each of the 
9 activities referred in the table (with the exclusion of the vague category of 
‘other activities’), and thus runs from a minimum of 0 (for people who do 
nothing) to 9 (for those who do everything listed). There is actually relatively 
little variation around the overall sample mean of 2.61. Conservative members 
score lowest, but even they fall within 0.26 of the overall mean on the scale. The 
one outlier is the SNP: its members are fully 0.54 above the overall mean – a 
striking symbol of the surge  that enabled the party to take 56 of the 59 Scottish 
seats at Westminster in 2015 (Mitchell 2015). 
 
So far, we have seen that, as reported in previous studies of political 
participation, the activities that require most of people in terms of time and 
effort are the things they are generally least likely to do (Whiteley, Seyd & 
Richardson 1994: 74-75), and that the older, larger, and more institutionalized 
parties have something of an advantage over the smaller parties in these high-
cost activities. It is now time to consider the underlying factors that might have 
driven the patterns of activism that we have recorded. 
 
Model results 
We start by running the General Incentives Model first for offline and then for 
online participation.  For each of our dependent variables we then run (1) the 
National Factors Model, (2) the Local Factors Model, and (3) a model including 
both National and Local factors.   
Tables 3 and 4 report odds ratio (OR) predictors of offline and online 
participation for each of the models tested. Coefficients above 1 indicate 
positive relationships between the independent and dependent variables, 
whereas those below 1 indicate negative relationships. In respect of the  General 
Incentives Model, we can see that predictions (Table 2) are almost completely 
verified for offline campaigning (model 1a): those respondents who have high 
group efficacy, high selective outcome and process incentives, high social norm 
pressures, and strong expressive motivations show the greatest breadth of 
campaign activity. Moreover, as expected, the perception of costs of activism is 
a significant disincentive for offline campaigning. That said, collective and 
altruistic incentives do not appear to play a significant role in accounting for 
the breadth of members’ participation offline. This is perhaps not too surprising 
if we consider that Western societies have become increasingly individualized 
in the last few decades (Baumann 2000), so collective and altruistic incentives 
might play a lesser role than hitherto. 
When it comes to online participation (model 1b), however, a slightly 
different picture emerges. As expected, after controlling for members who also 
participate offline, the perception of costs of activism is no longer significant. 
For most people, the cost of online activism is trivial and activities such as liking 
something from the party on Facebook can be carried out very quickly and 
easily. As with offline participation, collective incentives and altruism are not 
significant, but we also find that selective outcome incentives and social norms 
are not significant. In other words, only group efficacy, selective process and 
expressive incentives seem to be helpful predictors of more online 
participation. So, online activity helps people express their political identities, 
a process that helps them to feel they are engaging with like-minded people, 
albeit ‘only’ via social media, and encourages the belief that they might be 
contributing effectively to a collective effort in communicating messages 
favourable to their preferred parties. Thus, although we can largely confirm H1 
for offline participation, this is somewhat less true for online participation. This 
is perhaps unsurprising, given that the GIM was developed before the advent of 
the internet and political communication via social media, so it is less able to 
capture the incentives for new types of party activism. Even so, elements of it 
remain useful. 
Looking at demographic controls we can also see that being middle aged 
is a predictor of more activism, regardless of whether this is carried out offline 
or online. Interestingly, however, whereas offline activism is still mainly 
characterized by highly educated, high social grade males who have joined the 
party some time ago, online activism (once we control for those who also 
participate offline) is characterized by females who joined the party more 
recently. 
Moving to the innovative models we introduce in this paper (Table 3), 
the National Factors model (Model 2) reveals that self-perceived ideological 
radicalism relative to the national party – for left-leaning parties and right-
leaning parties – increases both online and offline campaign activity. In other 
words, those who participate in election campaigns tend to see themselves as 
more ideologically radical than their national parties than those who do not. 
Thus, our ‘May’s Law’ hypothesis (H2a) can be accepted. A positive view of the 
membership’s relationship with the national party leadership is also important 
for both offline and online campaigning (confirming H2b). Finally, joining the 
party after being approached by the national party reduces the likelihood of 
participation in offline campaigning compared to members who joined either 
on their own initiative or after being prompted by a local party. While this is 
consistent with H2c, the fact that recruitment by the national party does not 
affect online campaigning is a null finding.  
All our expectations of the Local Factors model (Model 3) relate to 
offline campaigning. We find that, as expected, the closer a member feels to 
their local party in left-right terms, the more likely he or she is to participate in 
offline campaigning (H3a accepted). Offline participation is also more likely if 
the member has a positive impression (ie, as united, friendly and interesting) 
of the local party (H3b confirmed). Moreover, offline campaign activity is 
spurred if a member has been recruited directly by the local party (H3c 
confirmed), as opposed to the national party or joining of one’s one volition. 
Finally, as hypothesised, constituency marginality does play an important role 
for major parties: all else being equal, the smaller the majority achieved by their 
local MP in 2010, the more members of the Labour and Conservative parties 
did in terms of offline activity during the 2015 campaign. The marginality effect 
is not significant for smaller parties (H2d confirmed). 
In so far as online participation is concerned (Model 3b), we can see that, 
as expected, after controlling for demographic effects and offline participation, 
these local factors do not exert the same impact as they do on offline 
participation. Their influence is either non-significant (in the case of ideological 
congruence with the local party or constituency marginality), or (in the case of 
having been recruited by the local party) negative. The only exception is that a 
positive impression of the local party has a positive impact on online activism.  
Finally, when we run the national and local factors together, we find that  
offline participation (Model 4a) is significantly enhanced by the following: self-
positioning as an ideological radical compared to the national party, while 
retaining a sense of proximity to the local party; being recruited via the local 
party; having positive attitudes towards the local party; and living in a 
competitive constituency if one is a member of one of the two biggest parties. 
Thus, the only difference from previous models is that, once we include local 
factors in the model, the view of the national leadership is no longer a 
significant driver of campaign participation. For online participation, previous 
findings are confirmed: self-perceived ideological radicalism, not being 
recruited via the local party, positive attitudes towards the local party, and 
positive attitudes towards the party leader are all factors that tend to increase a 
member’s participation online.  
H4 states that ‘National Factors will be stronger in predicting online 
participation, whereas the Local Factors will be more useful in predicting offline 
participation’.  Is this true? Not completely. For offline campaigning, two of the 
three national factor predictors have the expected effects, but the same can be 
said for online campaigning. The picture is clearer once we look at local factors, 
since all four of these are significant drivers of offline activity, but only two of 
them are significant drivers of online activity. We can, therefore, partially 
accept – or rather redefine - H4: whereas local factors play a bigger role in 
explaining offline participation, national factors play an important role in 
explaining both online and offline participation.9 
 
TABLES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conclusion 
At the outset of this paper, we set out two key questions to be addressed: How 
well does the General Incentives Model perform in the 21st century in predicting 
campaign activity both offline and, more innovatively, online?  Over and above 
the GIM, do national and local factors further help explain activism, and if so, 
do the effects differ significantly for online and offline activism? We are now in 
a position to answer these questions.  
With respect to the former question, our models suggest that General 
Incentives theory should remain central to our understanding of offline 
participation, although the fact that collective incentives and altruism are no 
longer significant might invite further reflection on the changes that have 
impacted on party membership in the last few decades. In this regard, the 
general trend towards the individualization of society remarked on by 
sociologists such as Baumann (2000), has found a certain counterpart in the 
organizational evolution of parties (Faucher, 2015), including the British 
Labour Party, which has gradually shifted from a longstanding model of 
collective delegatory democracy to individual representation (Watts 2017). 
With respect to online participation, only a few of the factors included in the 
original General Incentives Model actually help to predict activism. This 
suggests the need for research into the causes of online participation that goes 
beyond what we have been able to investigate here with limited data. 
Our paper also shows that, on the one hand, factors associated with the national 
parties improve our knowledge of participation by party members both offline 
and online. On the other hand, local party and constituency contextual factors 
add significant value to explanations of traditional offline activism. If an 
individual is recruited by his or her local party, becomes embedded within it as 
a social network, forms a positive impression of the way it conducts its business 
and feels comfortable with its general ideological outlook, he or she will be 
significantly more likely to campaign for it at election time – all the more so if 
this all happens to occur in a marginal constituency and he or she is a member 
of one of the major two parties. National party factors also seem to bear upon 
offline activism: being recruited via the national party disincentivizes offline 
participation, whereas feeling ideologically radical compared to the national 
party incentivizes it. 
We can also confirm that, as for the General Incentives Model, the national and 
local factor effects do indeed differ in certain key respects for offline and online 
activism. In particular, the local factors that matter for offline participation – 
such as a sense of ideological proximity to the local party and the electoral 
marginality of the constituency – do not carry any significant weight for online 
participation, whereas being recruited at the local level enhances offline but 
weakens online participation. 
The last point provides a fascinating cue for future research, namely the need 
to explore the impact of local contextual factors on members’ involvement in 
their party’s campaigns, both at election times and between them – something 
that could profitably be investigated through qualitative as well as quantitative 
methods (Garland 2016a,2016b).  We also need to know more, particularly in 
this increasingly digital age, about the quality, scope and, indeed, the effect of 
members’ involvement in their parties’ online campaigns (see, for example, 
Ridge-Newman, 2014).  Certainly, more traditional offline campaign activities 
are by no means a thing of the past – and our research suggests that if parties 
want members to get involved in such activities, then they need to think very 
carefully before rushing into making recruitment and participation more 
national and more digital. How to get party members to support and 
complement their own, often centralized, capital-intensive, and carefully-
controlled online efforts – something that the British Labour Party seemed able 
to do in 2017 – will be something on which parties have to reflect carefully too. 
 
  
 Table 1: Which of the following things did you do for the party 
during the 2015 election campaign? 
Activity 
Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total Measure of 
Association 
‘Liked’ something by 
party/candidate on 
FB 
39.6 51.1 47.4 44.2 67.6 72.7 53.4 
  
.245 
Tweeted/re-tweeted 
party/candidate 
messages 
26.0 36.9 31.1 22.9 45.7 48.6 35.2 
 
.197 
Displayed election 
poster in window 
29.6 51.2 37.8 42.9 45.1 67.7 45.7 
 
.247 
Delivered leaflets 43.5 42.5 45.9 38.3 28.8 35.4 39.4 
 
.113 
Attended public 
meeting or hustings 
31.3 31.4 28.2 40.5 27.3 49.0 34.6 
 
.159 
Canvassed face to face 
or by phone 
36.5 35.7 32.6 26.1 19.1 28.2 30.4 
 
.132 
Helped run party 
committee room 
12.5 8.4 13.0 5.7 2.4 5.3 8.1 
 
.138 
Drove voters to 
polling stations 
6.4 7.2 4.9 5.7 2.6 7.5 5.9 
 
.068 
Stood as candidate 
(councillor or MP) 
9.1 7.0 15.1 13.0 10.2 0.2 8.6 
 
.163 
 
Other 16.3 14.2 20.8 14.1 12.8 16.6 15.7 .065 
None 23.0 12.9 18.4 20.8 15.3 7.8 16.3 
 
.142 
Campaign Activism 
Index – Mean 
2.35 2.71 2.56 2.39 2.49 3.15 2.61 
 
.017 
Campaign Activism 
Index – SD 
2.15 2.11 2.19 2.10 1.88 1.90 2.08 
 
 
N 
1193 1180 730 785 845 963 5696 
 
Note: All activities figures are percentages. Campaign activism index is based on an additive 
scale that runs from 0 (no activity during the election campaign) to 9 (maximal activity during 
the campaign, excluding “other”). All relationships between party and type of campaign 
activity reported in this table are significant at p<.001. Measures of association are Cramer’s 
V except for that between party and Campaign Activism Index, for which Eta2 is used. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 2. The General Incentives Model: Offline & Online Political 
Activism during the Electoral Campaign (all parties) 
 
 M1 - General Incentives Model 
 Offline Online 
 OR SE OR SE 
Group efficacy (0-10) 1.07*** 0.01 1.05*** 0.01 
Selective Outcome (0-10) 1.07*** 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Selective Process (0-10) 1.08*** 0.01 1.03*** 0.01 
Collective Incentives (0-10) 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Expressive Incentives (0-10) 1.07*** 0.01 1.06*** 0.01 
Altruism (0-10) 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Social Norms (0-10) 1.04*** 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Cost of activism (0-10) 0.98* 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Socio-demographic and other 
controls     
Mainstream parties  
(vs. smaller parties) 0.92** 0.03 0.87*** 0.03 
Gender 0.94* 0.03 1.06* 0.03 
Education (1-7) 1.03** 0.01 1.02 0.01 
Social grade:  
ABC1 (vs. C2DE) 1.01 0.03 1.00 0.03 
Age 1.29*** 0.06 1.45*** 0.07 
Age squared 0.97*** 0.00 0.94*** 0.01 
Time of joining  
(past to recent) 0.95*** 0.01 1.04** 0.02 
Campaigned Offline   1.47*** 0.06 
Constant 0.20*** 0.04 0.15*** 0.03 
     
Alpha† 0.14 0.02   
McFadden Adj R2 0.06  0.09  
N 4087  4087  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a 0.10; Clustered s.e. per constituencies in parentheses. 
Note: Negative binomial regression (offline participation) & Poisson regression (online 
participation). Odds Ratio (OR) are displayed.  
† Over-dispersion parameter. As it is different from 0, our data is over-dispersed. 
 
 
  
Table 3. The National & Local Factors Models: Offline & Online Political Activism during the Electoral Campaign 
(all parties) 
 
 M2 - National Factors Model M3 - Local Factors Model M4 - National + Local Factors  
       Offline       Online       Offline        Online       Offline       Online 
 OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
National Factors             
LR Extremism 1.03*** 0.01 1.02* 0.01     1.03** 0.01 1.02
a 0.01 
Recruited via NAT 
party 0.70*** 0.06 1.01 0.08     0.75** 0.07 1.02 0.08 
Positive attitudes 
towards party leader 
(0-10) 1.04*** 0.01 1.05*** 0.01     0.99 0.01 1.02*** 0.01 
Local Factors             
LR distance at LOCAL 
level  (0-10)     0.98* 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.97* 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Recruited via LOCAL 
party     1.19*** 0.05 0.75*** 0.05 1.18*** 0.05 0.77*** 0.05 
Positive attitudes 
towards LOCAL party 
(0-10)     1.15*** 0.01 1.04*** 0.01 1.15*** 0.01 1.03*** 0.01 
Majority % in 2010 
(0-10)     0.99 0.01 1.02
a 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.02a 0.01 
Mainstream parties *    
      Majority % in 2010     0.95* 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.96* 0.02 0.98 0.02 
             
             
             
Socio-demographic & 
other controls             
Mainstream parties  
(vs. smaller parties) 0.97 0.04 0.92** 0.03 1.10a 0.06 0.93 0.04 1.06 0.06 0.96 0.05 
Gender: Female (vs. 
Male) 0.97 0.03 1.09*** 0.03 0.96a 0.03 1.11*** 0.03 0.95a 0.03 1.10*** 0.03 
Education (1-7) 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.01a 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Social grade:  
ABC1 (vs. C2DE) 0.96 0.03 0.99 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.99 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.99 0.03 
Age 1.18*** 0.06 1.46*** 0.07 1.18*** 0.06 1.42*** 0.07 1.17** 0.06 1.42*** 0.07 
Age squared 0.98*** 0.00 0.94*** 0.00 0.98*** 0.00 0.94*** 0.00 0.98*** 0.00 0.94*** 0.00 
Membership length 0.87*** 0.01 1.02 0.01 0.87*** 0.01 1.02 0.01 0.87*** 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Campaigned Offline   1.58*** 0.06   1.54*** 0.05   1.54*** 0.05 
Constant 1.79*** 0.26 0.32*** 0.04 0.77a 0.12 0.34*** 0.05 0.85 0.13 0.30*** 0.04 
             
Alpha† 0.38* 0.02 - - 0.29* 0.02 - - 0.28* 0.02 - - 
McFadden Adj R2 0.01  0.07  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.08  
AIC 17292.55  10900.37  16916.70  10899.24  16900.75  10884.00  
BIC 17370.36  10978.17  17007.47  10990.01  17010.97  10994.22  
N 4834  4834  4834  4834  4834  4834  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a 0.10; Clustered s.e. per constituencies in parentheses. 
Note: Negative binomial regression (offline participation) & Poisson regression (online participation). Odds Ratio (OR) are displayed.  
† Over-dispersion parameter: different from 0, thus our data is over-dispersed. 
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Notes 
1 Socio-demographic controls are gender, education, social grade, age and age 
squared (to capture a curvilinear relationship), as well as membership length.  
 
2 YouGov recruited the survey respondents from a panel of around 300,000 
volunteers who are given a small reward for completing a survey. Upon joining 
the YouGov panel volunteers complete a survey asking a broad range of 
demographic questions which are subsequently used to recruit respondents 
matching desired demographic quotas for surveys. Potential respondents for 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                           
the party member survey were identified from questions asking respondents if 
they were members of any of a list of large membership organisations, including 
the political parties. At the beginning of the fieldwork period some 8840 
YouGov panellists who were party members were invited to take part in the poll, 
and 5696 respondents subsequently took part in the survey, effectively a 
response rate of 64.4%. Results reported in this article are not weighted in any 
way since there are no known official population parameters for the various 
party memberships. However, previous YouGov party membership surveys 
using unweighted data have generated predictions for party leadership contests 
that came very close to (that is within 1% of) the final official outcome, which 
gives us confidence in the quality of the data. Further validation was provided 
by comparing demographics of our Liberal Democrat and Green Party samples 
with official figures supplied by the parties, and of our UKIP sample with those 
generated by a far larger UKIP survey (n=13568) conducted by Paul Whiteley 
and Matthew Goodwin using a mailback method. We are grateful to Professors 
Whiteley and Goodwin for facilitating this comparison.  We also gratefully 
acknowledge ESRC grant ES/M007537/1. 
 
3 Note that local elections were held on the same day as the parliamentary 
election in 2015. 
 
4 We use absolute loadings above 0.4. The variance of the first orthogonally 
rotated (varimax) component is 4.28, and the variance of the second one is 1.52, 
well over the usual cut-off point of 1. Since questions in the survey (e.g. “Have 
you…displayed a poster?”) offer only two answers (‘yes’ or ‘no’), we use 
polychoric correlations in the matrix used as the basis for PCA analysis. The 
factor loadings (above 0.4) are: 
Component 1 (offline)  Component 2 (online)  
Displayed election poster    0.623    
Delivered party leaflets   0.862    
Attended public meeting/hustings 0.751    
Canvassed     0.852    
Liked something on Facebook  0.476    0.796 
Tweeted     0.431    0.789 
                                                                                                                                           
Stood as candidate    0.697    
Helped run party committee  0.780    
Drove voters to polls   0.592   
 
5 Using factor loadings derived from the PCA as dependent variables proved 
problematic, given that each of the factor scores derives from analysis that takes 
into account all the activities, regardless of whether these are of the offline or 
online type.  
 
6 Count variables can be modelled using either negative binomial regression or 
Poisson regression. They both have the same mean structure, but negative 
binomial analysis also has an extra parameter (alpha) to model over-dispersion 
(i.e., when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean). In our case, 
we run Poisson regression for the online dependent variable, whereas negative 
binomial regression is more appropriate in the offline dependent variable due 
to a significant over-dispersion in the political participation index (ie. alpha is 
non-zero) (Long & Freese 2006).  
 
7  For ease of interpretation, all variables have been recoded from 0 to 10, 
moving from low to high unless otherwise stated. 
 
8 Of course, it is possible that members might restrict themselves to online 
activity but spend a great deal of time doing so,finding things to like or to 
retweet, etc. However, analysis of our data suggests that respondents 
themselves do not consider this to be the case. Of those who claimed to have 
spent no time at all on the campaign, an average of 4% still report having 
engaged in offline activities, while 20% Tweeted and 34% liked something on 
Facebook. Similarly, of those claiming to have spent up to 5 hours in total on 
the campaign, an average of 17% engaged in forms of offline activity, while fully 
35% Tweeted and 55% liked something on Facebook. It seems to safe to assume, 
therefore, that online activities are generally regarded as ‘low cost’ by members 
in terms of the implied time commitment. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
9  Although not of substantive interest in terms of our hypotheses, the 
demographic controls confirm that being a middle aged member is a predictor 
of more activism in both the offline and online realm. Consistent with what we 
found in the GIM model, once we take into account the national and local 
factors that might drive one to participate in the electoral campaign, it is also 
apparent that those who joined in the past tend to participate more offline, 
whereas females tend to participate more online. 
 
 
